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This Paper aims to explore the current system of the international 
liability funds in the maritime field. Through the systematic 
economical, legal and political analysis of the current and envisaged 
international, regional and national liability funds connected to the 
pollution of the seas, an overview of the function, efficiency and 
critical considerations of the chosen liability funds will be presented. 
A comparison between the international system of the compensation 
for the oil pollution damage (and the pending hazardous and noxious 
substances compensation model), and that of the United States is 
necessary, in order to determine a difference in approaches these two 
systems use to tackle the burning issues of oil (and hazardous and 
noxious substances) spills. A special consideration will be devoted to 
the questions of limited or unlimited liability, scope and strength of the 
Protection & Indemnity insurance and reinsurance market, problems 
of the channeling of the liability, moral hazard of the financial caps, 
and the general lack of the liability funds in the maritime field. Finally, 
an attempt will be made to consolidate the difference in opinions 
regarding the previously mentioned issues, and to predict the possible 
routes of changes awaiting the fund compensation systems.
Key words: CLC, OPA 90’, maritime liability funds, limitation of 
liability, P&I.
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INTRODUCTION
The shipping industry has since time immemorial enjoyed the privileged status 
when it comes to the questions of responsibility and liability. The interests of 
the carriers and other persons involved in the carriage by sea have always been 
well observed and respected when drafting different types of contracts, rules and 
conventions. And throughout maritime history, from what is known from the 
European past, and about to be learned from the Chinese historical maritime 
experience, there are numerous examples of maritime trade being favoured amongst 
others. The impact of the shipping industry to the World trade is enormous. Our 
way of life very much depends on the capability of the shipping industry to respond 
to our demands. Parallel to this, a ship sinking in the English Channel can have 
dire effects on the other side of the Globe, as the recent example of MSC Napoli 
has shown. Thus, it comes as no great surprise that the big maritime countries, and 
in the last 40 years the international community as a whole, have devised different 
methods of supporting the industry, not only with harmonizing the national 
maritime laws and brining certain rules and principles under the international legal 
umbrella, but also through financial support when claims for compensation start 
climbing hardly imaginable, yet existing figures. This last method, the international 
liability funds in the maritime field, will be the core of the research, with the goal 
of addressing a number of questions like: what sort of liabilities do the funds cover 
and who is contributing to them?; are the funds a better way to resolve the liability 
issues then the market insurance or Protection & Indemnity insurance (in further 
text: P&I Insurance)?; what is the impact of the existing funds in the practice?; why 
is there a parallel existence of funds covering the same issues?; and, is there a lack 
of liability funds, and if yes, why is this so?
To begin with, one has to look at the meaning of the word “fund” in the maritime 
field. According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, a fund is “A sum of money or other 
liquid assets established for a specific purpose”1. Funds in the maritime field comprise 
of those in connection with the shipping industry and the protection of the marine 
environment, primarily with the aim of serving as a source of payment when it 
comes to the cases of compensation for damages and restoration2. An individual 
maritime fund is a liability scheme set up by an international treaty or/and a national 
(maritime) law, and formulated as a fund in court3 after the accident occurs, in 
1 Garner, B.A. (ed.), “Black’s Law Dictionary”, Seventh Edition (West Group, St. Paul, Minnesota, 
1999), pp. 682/683.
2 They can be also founded for other purposes, such as, e.g., for funding the development of the 
navigational infrastructure (as we shall see in one of the examples later on); however, this Paper 
will focus on the predominant ones that cover liability issues primarily.
3 “Money deposited to pay a contingent liability”, Garner, B.A. (ed.), footnote 1, pp. 682.
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order to invoke the rules of the limitation of liability4. A mutual fund, defined as “A 
pool of investments owned in common and managed for a fee”5, in the maritime sense 
is a fund with more then one contributor, established before the accident occurs. 
It is normally founded in an international, regional or national legal regime, in 
connection to an existing system of liability (the individual fund liability scheme), 
where it is believed that an additional element of financial security is necessary as 
to have a successful compensation for the costs of damages and efforts to remove 
the negative effects of those damages. Thus, mutual maritime funds usually come 
into play when: a) a person designated to be liable cannot be held liable; b) a person 
designated to be liable is financially incapable to compensate the claims, and c) the 
total amount of damage exceeds the limits of liability. Usual contributors in the 
maritime field can be found among: a) member states to an international treaty 
establishing an international fund; b) shipping, oil, insurance and other types of 
industries, and in some cases (as we shall see in the United States - in further text: 
US - example); c) a contribution from a specially formulated tax law. This goes to 
show that the risks of the enterprise tend to be shared among all those who receive 
a certain benefit from a successful conclusion of the same. It however does not 
indicate that they are assuming liability; it only portrays the importance of the 
regular flow of goods over oceans, and the willingness of all the interested parties 
to voluntarily participate in the compensation scheme (in order to protect the 
interest of the parties held liable (the shipping industry), and at the same time try 
to satisfy the claims of the victims of the accident). The same kind of reasoning 
can be applied to the environment protection, with the clear goal of protecting the 
nature that is a part of our common heritage. A special type of a maritime mutual 
fund is the P&I insurance offered by the Protection & Indemnity Clubs (in further 
text: P&I clubs), that are defined as “A mutual association of shipowners to protect 
themselves against those risks for which they are not covered under ordinary marine 
insurance”6. Although they do not fit into the category of the funds discussed in 
further text, P&I clubs play a significant role in the maritime field, and it would 
4 A relevant document is the: “Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims”, 1976, 
London, 19 November 1976, as amended by the “Protocol of 1996 to amend the Convention on 
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims of 19 November 1976 London”, 2 May 1996, Chapter III: 
The Limitation Fund, Art. 11-14, available at: www.admiraltylawguide.com.
5 Garner, B.A. (ed.), footnote 1, pp. 683.
6 Branch, A. E., “Dictionary of Shipping International Trade Terms and Abbreviations”, 3rd Edition 
(Witherby, London, 1986), pp. 396; The definition further continues: “In particular third party 
liability which is not covered by the usual hull and cargo policies obtained in the marine insurance 
markets… These include personal injury to passengers and crew, damage to or loss of cargo, claims 
arising from another ship or other object, removal of wreck and so on”. As a point of reference, the 
marine insurance is defined as: “An agreement to indemnify against injury to a ship, cargo, or profits 
involved in a certain voyage or for specific vessel during a fixed period”, Garner, B.A. (ed.), footnote 1, 
pp. 806.
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be virtually impossible not to incorporate them into the overall discussion of the 
topic. As the goal of this Paper is to examine the international system of liability 
funds, we shall only focus on the mutual maritime funds established or proposed 
by various international treaties and documents (with an exception of the US 
system).
THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME ON LIABILITY AND 
COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
The most renowned international liability regime today (in connection with 
our topic) is the existing International Regime on Liability and Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage (in further text: International regime), consisting of the 
1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (in 
further text: 1992 CLC), the 1992 International Convention on the Establishment 
of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (in further 
text: 1992 Fund), as well as the 2003 International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Supplementary Fund (in further text: 2003 Supplementary Fund). As a point of 
reference, the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund are preceded by the 1969 International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (entered into force in 1975) 
and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (entered into force in 1978 and 
ended in 2002, involved in 100 incidents, around £329 million of compensation 
payments). They however lost their practical meaning when majority of the 
Member States decided to denounce them and join the 1992 CLC and the 1992 
Fund, with only 38 States still holding the 1969 Convention in force, and only 3 
major claims related to the old Fund still pending for completion – Vistabella, 
Nissos Amorgos and Ponotoon 3007.
Ever since the first major tanker incidents occurred8, the international 
community came to realize that the changes are necessary in order to better 
protect the environment, the shipping industry, and the victims of the pollution. 
Since a spill of oil can create a significant harm to the marine environment, a set 
7 A source of the given data, with the additional detailed information on the 1969 and 1971 Con-
ventions, can be found in: “The IOPC Fund’s 25 Years of Compensating Victims of Oil Pollution In-
cidents”, International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds; “Annual Report 2007”, International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Funds; available at: www.iopcfund.org; or additionally: Jacobsson, M., 
“The International Liability and Compensation Regime for Oil Pollution from Ships – International 
Solutions for a Global Problem”, Tulane Maritime Law Journal, vol. 32, , no. 1, 2007, pp. 1-33.
8 For a short overview, see: Pavliha, M., Grbec, M., “The 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol: An Im-
provement to the International Compensations System for Oil Pollution Damage”, Zbornik Pravnog 
fakulteta u Zagrebu, vol. 58, br. 1-2, pp. 308-312.
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of international regulations were prepared to prevent or minimize a possibility of 
an oil spill9. The effect resulting from a spill creates enormous monetary claims, 
thus placing the owner of the tanker into a great jeopardy of insolvency. Finally, 
the victims of oil pollution, the coastal states, people living by the coast and their 
respectful business, suffer significant damages and setbacks, especially if the 
shipowner has no available funds for compensation. Therefore, it was decided to 
set up a scheme where the maritime community would share a part of the burden 
that the shipowners bear, in order to try to resolve the issues named, and at the 
same time keep the transportation of oil going10.
The 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund entered into force in 1996, and by the end of the 
2008 will have a total of 102 Members11. They come into play in cases of spill of 
persistent oil from a tanker in the territory, territorial sea, EEZ or an equivalent 
area of a Member State12. The Conventions create the so-called “Three Tier Liability 
System”. In the first instance (1992 CLC) a shipowner is made liable up to a maximum 
amount of 89.77 million SDR (£71 million or US$140 million). A limitation of 
liability system is adopted, depending on the gross tonnage of the ship,13 and up 
to the mentioned cap, in order to protect the shipowners of having to pay major 
claims on their own and therefore suffer the consequences (insolvency, or a major 
setback in the investment and business strategy). Additionally, insurance is made 
compulsory for all vessels carrying over 2.000 tones of persistent oil as cargo, and 
the institute of strict liability is introduced14. In practice, it is the P&I clubs who are 
paying according to the insurance policy. In the second instance (1992 Fund) the 
First International Fund (in further text: Fund) is created, with the obligation to 
pay in cases where the shipowner is exempt, financially incapable (and insurance 
9 For more on this subject, see: Ehlers, P., “Origins and Compensation of Marine Pollution”, in: Base-
dow, J., Magnus, U. (ed.), “Pollution of the sea – Prevention and Compensation”, Hamburg Studies 
on Maritime Affairs, vol. 10 (Springer, Berlin, 2007), pp. 113-128.
10 For a critical view on the separation of liabilities, see: Seward, R.C., “The Insurance Viewpoint”, 
in: “The Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability: The New Law”, (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1986), 
pp. 183-184.
11 All the data and information is derived from the same source as in the footnote 7.
12 Main types of claims: property damage, clean-up operations and preventive measures, losses in 
fishery, mariculture and tourism sectors, consequential loss, pure economic loss, environmental 
damage (reasonable measures of reinstatement undertaken or to be undertaken).
13 5.000 gross tonnage – 4.51 million SDR (£3.6 million or US$7 million); 5.000 - 140.000 gross 
tonnage – previous amount plus 631 SDR (£499 or US$983) for every additional unit of tonnage; 
over 140.000 gross tonnage – 89.77 mil SDR (£71 mil or US$140 mil).
14 Exceptions: act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection, grave natural disaster, sabotage by a third 
party, negligence of the public authority.
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insufficient), or the damage exceeds the shipowner’s liability15. The Fund is financed 
by the oil receivers with more than 150.000 tons of crude or heavy fuel oil after 
sea transport in one calendar year (mainly big oil companies and oil trading 
companies). A limitation cap is set to 203 million SDR (£161 million or US$316 
million), including the first instance amount. So far, the Fund has been involved 
in 33 incidents with £231.5 million (or US$461 million) paid in compensation. 
Finally, in the third instance (2003 Supplementary Fund), a Second International 
Fund is created (in further text: Supplementary Fund), again financed by the oil 
receivers under the same conditions as with the Fund16. Maximum amount of the 
compensation is 750 million SDR (£594 million or US$1168 million), including the 
amount of the first two instances. So far, no incidents have occurred involving the 
Supplementary Fund.
During the course of time, it was realized that there is an obvious disproportion 
between the contribution of the smaller tankers and the oil receivers. Thus, the 
International Group of P&I Clubs (in further text: International Group) has 
proposed a voluntary scheme known as the Small Tanker Pollution Indemnification 
Agreement (in further text: STOPIA 2006)17, by which vessels up to 29.548 gross 
tons voluntarily increased their liability up to 20 million SDR, thus making the P&I 
clubs obliged to indemnify the Fund for the difference between the 1992 CLC limit 
and the voluntary increase. Additionally, the contributors to the Supplementary 
Fund had felt too exposed to the compensation amounts, which has resulted in 
another voluntary scheme, the Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement (in 
further text: TOPIA 2006), where the shipowners, or P&I clubs, to be more precise, 
agreed on indemnifying the Supplementary Fund for the 50% of the compensation 
amount. A voluntary scheme to replace the formal redrafting of a convention is 
a relatively novel approach to the creation of an international ruling, but reflects 
the needs and interests of the practice. As well as the 2003 Supplementary Fund, 
these two schemes were created in order to respond to the growing concern of 
the parties involved and address the imbalance in the shipping industry (more on 
this later). What is perhaps most interesting about their appearance, as far as the 
topic of this Paper is concerned, is the fact that they testify to, from one side, the 
economical strength that the P&I clubs and the International Group posses, but 
also, the influence of the International Group in the international maritime law 
area (without their cooperation, it is hard to imagine that a similar pair of schemes 
15 The Fund will not be obliged to pay if: a damage occurs in a Non-Member State, damage is caused 
by an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a spill from a warship, and, a claimant is un-
able to fit the facts of the case under the scope of the definitions of the ships.
16 With a special provisions regarding the possibility of the Member States having to contribute, for 
more on this see: “The Annual Report 2007”,  footnote 7, pp. 37.
17 Preceded by the STOPIA agreement.
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would come into force, thus opening a variety of problems). Without a proper 
insurance, nobody is willing to go into a serious shipping business, the market 
insurance is often too expensive when it comes to certain number of policies, and 
thus the P&I clubs are the only solution. Without their support and will to insure, 
it is hard to envisage much of the existing and planned transport of people and 
goods over oceans. That goes to show how much actual influence do the shipowners 
(members of the P&I clubs) hold when it comes to decide upon important issues 
such as a creation of new conventions, a question of the limitation of liability, or 
other similarly important issues connected to the shipping.
Another interesting question that arises is whether a fund related to the oil 
pollution is necessary any more, at least in the current form. If the P&I clubs are 
prepared to compensate the oil receivers for 50% of their contribution in a case of 
a claim before the Supplementary Fund, then one can ask if it would be reasonable 
to leave the compensation system to the P&I clubs all together (in connection 
with this, if they are capable of covering a half of the Supplementary Fund, surely 
they would be capable to compensate the amount of the Fund as well). So far, the 
Supplementary Fund has not been put in use, and in a case of an oil spill it is still 
hard to imagine an occurrence where an overall consumption of the Supplementary 
Funds’ assets would occur (especially due to the extended regulation of the safety 
and security of the shipping, ever improving salvage capabilities, and better and 
safer ship designs and crew education)18. As the ideas of the unlimited liability were 
emerging, with constant urging for higher compensation levels, the Supplementary 
Fund was introduced to tackle the issues and modernize the International regime, 
but also to keep the same in life. Probably to further support this initiative, P&I 
clubs decided to involve themselves even more by offering the above mentioned 
voluntary schemes. Obviously, due to the strength of their mutual funds (which 
cover, as said before, all sorts of risks, including the oil pollution, and are capable 
of individually handling all claims up to the amount of US$7 million), the risk 
calculations and the mutual reinsurance (the so called Pool, from US$7 million up 
to about US$ 5.4 billion) as well as the market reinsurance capabilities (from US$50 
million up to US$2.5 billion), the P&I clubs19 are now in a position to offer greater 
coverage and broaden their policies (something the market insurance would not 
do, or would, but with unacceptably high premiums). Thus, in practice, the system 
would not change significantly if the P&I clubs would offer their members, in a 
case of an oil pollution, a compensation policy that would comprise of the initial 
18 Although, the case of Exxon Valdez, with billions of US$ of claims, led to separate system of an oil 
compensation; a fact that goes to prove that accidents of such a magnitude are still possible and 
important to address (more on this in the US section of the Paper).
19 The above mentioned data and other information on P&I clubs can be found on: http://www.
igpandi.org/The+Group+Agreements/Pool+reinsurance+programme.
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value of 89,77 million SDR (current first instance), plus 203 million SDR (current 
second instance), plus 375 million SDR (current half value of the third instance). 
This idea needs further investigation. First of all, the shipowners should not feel 
any significant difference, as they are already contributing to the P&I clubs’ mutual 
funds, with perhaps a slight rise in premium due to the incorporation of the 
Fund compensation value20 (as an additional support to this claim, the minimal 
changes in the P&I insurance premiums in the US example are to be taken 
into consideration). Second of all, the oil receivers would feel a relief, as now a 
significant amount of assets can be used for other purposes. Thirdly, the victims of 
the oil pollution should feel no additional difficulty, as the method of claims would 
simply be extended to the above stated values (in most cases, in first instance or 
all together, it is the P&I clubs who are dealing with the claims anyways). And 
finally, an international fund would still exist, although one can think of different 
ways to constitute it. On one hand, it could remain as it is, covering the value 
above the proposed P&I cover (and therefore having just one fund in existence), 
with a possibility of making the cap value even higher (due to the fact that the oil 
receivers now feel a significant relief of their duties). On the other hand, one could 
abolish the international fund as a fund created before the accident arises, but 
rather constitute it as post factum fund, coming into play where the compensation 
figures go beyond the covered value. In such a case, a methodology of the existing 
funds would come into play, with the same scope of duties and rules. Although 
the current system of the International regime performs to full satisfaction of all 
the concerned parties, this change would perhaps simplify the procedure between 
the funds and the P&I clubs (elimination of the voluntary schemes), open the way 
to higher compensations limits, and perhaps make the International regime more 
attractive to the countries that are not participating in it (most notably, US and 
People’s Republic of China).
But, in order to address the issues of a uniformed system of oil liability and 
compensation regimes on a global scale, one first has to look at a number of 
issues where, to begin with, the International regime is criticized, and then after, 
where the US system differs. The rationale behind the decision of the international 
community to share a part of a burden lies in the fact that the transport of oil is 
vital to the World economy and everyday life. Since everybody enjoys benefits, 
an equal distribution of risk should be made. The shipowners are therefore, as we 
have seen, liable up to a certain amount, wherefrom the oil receivers contribute 
20 Should this however turn out to a bit more expensive than anticipated, one can always assume 
that the 50% value of indemnification in the Supplementary Fund could be lowered to fit the 
desired amount. It is however important to note that the recent significant rise in premiums of 
some P&I Clubs (Steamship and Japan Shipowners’), due to the current turbulence in the market 
(significant downturn of the freight rates, piracy and other factors that put an uneasy question 
mark on an overall shipping industry) shows that it is perhaps still too early to consider any ma-
jor changes in the system, for more on this, visit: http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/home/index.htm.
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to the two International funds created to provide an additional financial coverage 
of claims. This in the end reflects on the price of refined oil at the gas stations 
and households, thus encompassing a large body of contributors, as envisaged. 
The reasons for having two funds instead of one is explained through the fact 
that the conditions on the market change; with more expensive oil and bigger 
ships, the claims tend to get higher, thus placing the victims of the pollution in 
an unfavorable position. As mentioned previously, after being subjected to a lot 
of criticism, with the appearance of a US national fund for a similar purpose, and 
the emergence of calls for a regional European fund, the response came in a form 
of a Supplementary Fund, offering greater coverage, and thus satisfying the need, 
at least for the time being. Whereas some of the issues mentioned will receive a 
separate attention later in the text, a short summary of criticism addressed to the 
international regime will be presented, as a way of introduction to the US national 
system. This only serves as a reminder of the different ways that the funds can be 
set up, and not as an attempt to research additional issues.
CRITICISM
A fair amount of criticism reflects to the claim that the financial caps raise a 
question of the moral hazard of shipping21. If a shipowner knows the limits in 
advance, he might be less encouraged to invest into the quality and safety of his 
ships (by calculating the odds between the investment on one hand and the risk 
of a liability on the other), thus creating a phenomenon known as sub-standard 
shipping22. Whereas the limitation is seen as an instrument of making the risks 
insurable, if the above mentioned de-responsibilization is a state of fact, limitation 
may well lead to the under-deterrence and the increase of a risk probability. This, 
among other things, would bring more strain to the insurance market, shipowners, 
and finally, the effects would be felt on the shipping market as well. As the oil 
receivers are normally found among big, multinational oil companies, that usually 
own tankers of their own, the same sort of argumentation, if valid, could be 
21 More on the issue, see: Faure M., Wang H., “The International Regimes for the Compensation of Oil 
Pollution Damage: Are they effective?”, Review of European Community & International Environ-
mental Law, vol. 12, issue 3, 2003, pp. 244-251.
22 Faure warns that this could have a negative impact for the victims who are acting as a third party, 
unable to bargain for a better standing position (like the Coase theorem suggests). However, he 
emphasizes that: “The risk of under-deterrence may therefore only arise in those (catastrophic) cases 
where the amount of the damage actually was higher that the cap”, and that the liability rules are 
only supplementary to the overall regulation concerning the safety of shipping. More on these 
arguments see: Faure, M., Hui, W., “Financial caps for oil pollution damage: A historical mistake?”, 
Marine Policy, vol. 32, issue 4, 2008, pp. 594-595; Citation from pp. 599.
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presented regarding them as well. On the other hand, speaking strictly from the 
International funds contributors’ point of view, if the above occurrence is a reality, 
then one could question the purpose of a fund that is created to take care of 
somebody else’s misconducts. To conclude on this issue, although the search of 
profit can, and sometimes does lead through a field of illegality, one would have to 
compile a fair amount of case law, evidence and testimony before sanctioning the 
financial caps system on the mentioned grounds.
Channeling of the liability is a legal instrument that excludes a certain number 
of persons from liability. The main idea is to shorten the procedure, prevent 
duplication of the proceedings and quickly settle the claims by clearly establishing 
who is to be held liable and on what claims. As a result, a major principle of the 
maritime law, the so called “polluter pays” principle, has been over-run. Whereas 
some criticize this, seeing no reasons why certain people currently excluded23 
should not be held liable if, for instance, proved with negligence, others claim that 
the system was drawn to satisfy a number of interests. First of all, the shipowner 
being strictly liable and the ability of the victim of the pollution to make a direct 
claim from the P&I clubs makes things far more clear and simple. Secondly, the 
International funds are created to continue with the compensation after the first 
instance limits are reached, thus further encouraging the victim’s effort to receive 
compensation. Furthermore, since the shipowner has a P&I cover, he may well feel 
reassured that his business will not suffer an irrecoverable loss. Finally, the fact 
that, for instance, salvors and charterers are excluded, apart from going directly to 
their favor (salvors due to the fact that they will not be able to get a P&I policy that 
would cover an oil spill, the market insurance would be way too expensive, and 
that a possible claim in full against them might result in a bankruptcy; charterers 
due to the fact that they can not become members of the P&I club, which would 
lead to the same effects as with the salvor), it also seems to favor the shipowners, 
since the salvors tend to prevent the accidents from occurring in the first place, 
and charterers without having to buy expensive market insurance policies, are able 
to pay more for the charter. However, one can question why, for example, a salvor, 
being a professional, and having paid accordingly, should be left out in a case of 
professional (gross) negligence. As a signal of this reasoning, the new Bunker 
Convention24 shortens the list of the exclusions (the salvors are not included).
Finally, perhaps the most disputed and contested issue today regarding the 
liability is the question of breaking the limits of liability. To begin with, a major 
23 Servants or agents of the owners, the crew, the pilot, the charterer (including the bareboat char-
terer), manager or operator of the ship, or any person carrying out salvage operations or taking 
preventive measures.
24 For more on the Bunker Convention, see: Zhu, L., “Compulsory Insurance and Compensation for 
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage”, Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, vol. 5 (Springer, Berlin, 
2007); especially pp. 27-28.
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criticism addresses the fact that so far, the International regime has failed to fully 
compensate three major oil spill cases, Nakhodka, Erika and Prestige. Although 
this number seems small in comparison with all the cases 1992 Fund had to deal 
with, it serves as an indicator that even with the Supplementary Fund in place, 
a time may come, keeping in mind the fact that the ships are getting bigger all 
the time, when even the current maximum figure will not be enough. Although 
the International regime seems to keep a rather successful reactive feature, with 
constant rising and adjustments of liability caps, one may question the rationale 
of keeping the liabilities limited, if this leads to the constant raise of the limits. 
Additionally, and what is perhaps the most significant breaking point between the 
International and US regimes, the definition of the institute of the loss of liability, 
in the International regime is set in a way to be virtually unbreakable25, thus, 
keeping the limits firm and clear. When looking back to the historical perspective 
of the limitation of liability, Faure reasons that the limitation institute was pushed 
forwards to encourage shipping as well as to promote the national merchant fleets. 
Arguments coming out of a more recent times include a fair risk distribution 
(shared between all who benefit from the activity), protection of the carrier and 
those who benefit from the shipping industry (keeping the insurance premiums as 
low as possible (thus making the freight costs lower) and minimizing the chance of 
a bankruptcy due to the damages incurred by an accident, thus keeping the world 
fleet in high numbers), and the ability of the insurance industry to offer acceptable 
rates of premiums26. The main supportive argument for this reasoning comes from 
the fact that it is believed that only a limited, fixed value can be insured, whereas 
unlimited liability might lead to uninsured risks, therefore creating instability 
on the market. Following this presumption, Faure argues that if the owner’s loss 
of the right of limitation leads to the loss of liability insurance cover, the “… 
claimants would be discouraged from challenging the shipowner’s right of limitation of 
liability…” in order to avoid confronting “… a defendant without insurance cover”27. 
For instance, a single-ship company, with low or no assets, and insolvency about 
to be pronounced, might become even more dangerous should the negligence be 
proven, for that could give an insurer the right to cancel the insurance policy. As 
a contra argument, the same author suggests that the argument of predictability 
of the insurable liability can be overcome by making the liability “unlimited while 
25  “The owner shall not be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention if it is proved that the 
pollution damage resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such 
damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result”, Art. 6, paragraph 
2, footnote 3.
26 Faure, M., Hui, W., footnote 22, pp. 594-595.
27 Faure, M., Hui, W., ibid.
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the amount of insurance can be restricted to a certain amount”28. Another author 
that contradicts the overall acceptance of the liability is Gauci, who comments the 
following:
“Investment in shipping may be considered as widespread enough not to require 
any discriminatory stimulant. A limitation statute can also produce grotesque 
results, as in the case of the Torrey Canyon 17 where the limitation ceiling was 
US$50 as salved value, i.e. the value of one lifeboat, is Moreover, the widespread 
use of insurance and particularly third party insurance considerably reduces 
any possible risk”29.
Commenting the argument of insurable risks, Gauci states that:
“Prima facie this seems to be a very reasonable argument; however, one can also 
validly argue that in the case of unlimited liability allocated against a shipowner, 
there is nothing to prevent the underwriter from protecting himself by inserting 
in the insurance policy a ceiling beyond which claims cannot proceed”30.
Furthermore, he quoted prof. Wetterstein, who stated that:
“The role played by insurance costs in competition . . . seems to have been 
exaggerated in international discussion. The introduction of unlimited liability 
would mean only a marginal - if even that - increase in costs. I cannot accept 
insurance costs as a key argument for limitation of maritime liability. Such 
arguments are not normally acceptable in other fields and, furthermore, there 
exist other means to give favourable treatment to national merchant fleets and 
to improve their international competitiveness. This should not be at the expense 
of the injured party/ies”31.
Finally, this system neglects the possibility of negligence as a way of a loss of 
liability, a fact that supports the moral hazard argument.
In order to avoid the danger of a purely theoretical struggle in determining 
which principle offers a better and a more coherent approach to the issue of the oil 
pollution, now follows a short overview of the US regime on the oil liability and 
compensation, with the appropriate remarks on where the US regime differentiates 
from the International one.
28 Faure, M., Hui, W., ibid, pp. 598-599.
29 Gauci, G., “Limitation of liability in Maritime Law: an anachronism”, Marine Policy, vol. 19, issue 
1, 1995, pp. 66.
30 Gauci, ibid.
31 Gauci, ibid, pp. 66-67.
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THE UNITED STATES SYSTEM
The US have decided not to become a part of the International regime, and 
instead devised a separate system. Among the variety of reasons32, one can 
distinguish the following ones: a) liability limits were too low (at the time, the 1969 
Convention was in force, with the compensation coverage that did not successfully 
counterpart the rise of costs in reality); b) problem was too urgent (with the Exxon 
Valdez incident in 1989, and a few other accidents happening at the same time, the 
US feared that until the world community agrees on a new convention, too much 
time would be wasted); c) strong economic position of the US (it was believed 
that the US market is strong enough to sustain all compensations on its own), 
and; d) the necessity of an individual state approach (and old American argument 
supporting the sovereignty of states when it comes to the situations where a state 
and international law might differ, combined with the idea that an individual 
state can better recognize its’ own special circumstances, conditions and proper 
methods for protection and compensation, and thereby establish an effective 
policy in environmental matters). As a result, one can note significant structural 
and principal differences between the International regime and the US system.
Prior to 1990, with multiple state law regulation, the US also had a significant 
amount of federal law focused on the protection of the environment and regulation 
of the flow of oil and hazardous and noxious substances (in further text: HNS). 
Regarding oil, a number of regulations were present from the 50-ies onwards, 
including: the 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (which constituted the 
Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund with the US$200 million cap), the 1973 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund, 
US$100 million cap), the 1974 Deepwater Port Act (amended by the 2002 Maritime 
Transportation Security Act, Deepwater Port Liability Fund with minimum 
balance of US$4 million), and the 1977 Clean Water Act (CWA, a revolving fund, 
US$35 million, preceded by the 1970 Federal Water Quality Improvement Act). 
All the named funds are today incorporated into the 1990 Oil Spill Liability Trust 
Fund (in further text: OF)33, established by the 1990 Oil Pollution Act (in further 
text: OPA 90’)34, main legislation covering all issues regarding the liability and 
responsibility in a case of oil pollution35. The shipowner’s liability is established 
for the vessels over 300 gross tons, with detailed provisions regarding tankers 
32 For a detailed overview of the background for the US decision, see: De La Rue, C., Anderson, C. 
B., “Shipping and the Environment”, (LLP, London, 1998), pp. 58-66.
33 For an overview of the OF and the text, visit: www.uscg.mil/npfc/About_NPFC/osltf.asp.
34 For an overview of the OPA 90 and the text, visit: www.uscg.mil/npfc/About_NPFC/opa.asp.
35 Scope of application – navigable waters, adjoining shoreline,  EEZ, deep ocean waters.
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and other vessels and facilities36. The first visible difference from the International 
regime is the inclusion of vessels other than tankers and offshore facilities into the 
liability scheme (something that has only been recently tackled with the Bunker 
convention, regarding vessels other than tankers). Breaking of the limitation is 
made relatively easy, as the unlimited liability is set to come into force should a spill 
occur “… due to the gross negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of any federal 
operating or safety regulation”37. Therefore, the cases of unlimited liability occur 
often in the US regime. Another important factor to be considered with the noted 
breach of limitation possibility is the fact that the OPA 90’ does not pre-empt state 
legislation, thus creating the multiplicity of claims. These two factors significantly 
differ from the founding principles of the International regime. During the drafting 
of the international legislation it was feared that the implementation of such two 
elements would quite possibly endanger the position of the shipowners, insurers 
and victims, as portrayed in the previous section (it will be interesting to see how 
the US regime functioned since its adoption, more on this later). Going back to 
the overview of the US system, the OF today amounts to a sum of a maximum 
of US$2.7 billion (latest increase due to the 2005 Energy Policy Act), almost 
three time the value the international system has to offer. It consists of two parts: 
The Emergency Fund (used for a quick response to discharges and initiation of 
natural resources damage assessments, up to a US$100 million per year), and the 
Principal Fund (for removal costs, natural resource damages and restoration and 
other purposes38). The contribution comes from various sources, the main being 
the 5-cent-per-barrel tax39 (again, a point of differentiation with the International 
regime).
Regarding the implementation of the OF in practice, a number of issues has 
arisen from the very start, some of which we shall mention. Many companies, out of 
a fear of the unlimited liability, decided to leave the US waters altogether, or at least 
become charterers, as to avoid the liability scheme. Many foretold the 30% to 50% 
rise of the P&I insurance for tankers and other vessels entering the OPA 90’ scope of 
application. Also, many found the system of certificates for financial responsibility 
36 Tankers - less then 3.000 gross tonnage – US$ 1200 per ton of US$ 2 million (which is greater); 
over 3.000 gross tonnage - US$ 1200 per ton or US$ 10 million (which is greater); other vessels - 
US$ 600 per ton or US$500,000 (which is greater); offshore facilities up to US$75 million, onshore 
facilities and deepwater ports up to US$350 million.
37 “Oil Pollution Act 1990”, Title 33: Navigation and Navigable waters, Chapter 40: Oil Pollution, 
Subchapter I: Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation, Section 2704: Limits on Liability, c) Ex-
ceptions, 1) Acts of responsible party, footnote 34.
38 Available for: removal costs resulting from discharge/threat of discharge from a foreign offshore 
unit, uncompensated removal costs, and federal costs.
39 Others include: fines, penalties, cost recoveries, transfers from previous funds, barrel tax and 
interests.
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to be too demanding and complicated. Finally, a lot of concern was devoted to 
the question of how long and how complicated would the actual proceedings be, 
having in mind the multiplicity of charges available. The last concern has proven 
to be correct, at least when it comes to the major cases. The Exxon Valdez case is a 
good example on how long a case can last40. The insurance issue has been resolved, 
with only minimal adjustments to the P&I premiums41. Companies that have left 
American waters came back, probably after realizing that even with the unlimited 
liability, the risk of too high a compensation claim is not a determining issue after 
all. Additionally, studies show that in the last 15 years the number of oil accidents 
has decreased, thus, especially having in mind the double hull requirement42, it 
would seem that the OPA 90’ is having a positive effect43.
Another relevant piece of legislation is the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (in further text: CERCLA), accompanied 
by the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (in further text: 
SARA). The mentioned legislation is also known as the Superfund, with the purpose 
of collecting tax from chemical and petroleum industries in order to clean up 
hazardous sites (it covers all the HNS pollution not covered by the OPA 90’)44. The 
functioning and the scope of this legislation might provide useful information and 
ideas when trying to resolve some issues related to the implementation of similar 
regulation on the international level.
From what is known of the US approach to (not) ratifying the international 
conventions (although they usually participate with laudable contribution), it is 
hard to imagine that the US Congress would ever accept to change their own system 
in favor of the International regime as it is today. The still present case of the great 
Alaskan spill would cause too much negative publicity should any congressman try 
to propose adopting the system where the responsibility for negligence (something 
very important in the US liability law) is non-existent. So the current status quo 
remains. Whereas this causes a lot of eyebrows rising in favor of establishing a 
40 For more information on the case, visit: http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/.
41 Kiern L.I., “Liability, Compensation and Financial Responsibility under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: 
A Review of the First Decade”, 24 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 2000, pp. 33-38.
42 For the comparison of the level of protection of the environment in the International and US 
system, see: La Fayette, L. A. de, “Compensation for Environmental Damage in Maritime Liability 
Regimes”, in: Kirchner A. (ed.), “International Maritime Environmental Law” (Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 2004, UK), pp. 231-265.
43 For the figures, see: “The U.S. Coast Guard under The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: National Response 
Structure, the New Carissa, and Enforcement”, available at: http://www.uscg.mil/; also: Homan, A. 
C., Steiner, T., “OPA 90’s Impact at Reducing Oil Spills”, Marine Policy, vol. 32, issue 4, 2008, pp. 711-
718.
44 For more information on the Superfund, visit: http://www.epa.gov/superfund/index.htm.
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unified system, one could debate on which system offers better protection to whom. 
Should however a melting of the rules one day occur, it would play a significant 
role, not just in simplifying the life of shipowners, but also in compelling other 
countries that are not a member of any regime (a good example would be China, 
that even hasn’t got a proper regime of its own) to become one. It would also serve 
as a good starting point in bringing the US, and other countries, closer to ratifying 
other important international maritime law instruments.
HNS CONVENTION
As the US system together with the oil pollution additionally covers the damages 
for the HNS pollution, it is opportune at this point to briefly describe the attempt to 
regulate the same issue on an international level. The 1996 International Convention 
on the Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage 
of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (in further text: HNS Convention)45 
is a convention not yet in force, and with a dubious probability of a success46. It 
establishes the International Hazardous and Noxious Substances Fund (in further 
text: HNS Fund) and creates the Two Tier Liability System. In the first instance, the 
shipowner is made liable up to a maximum amount of 100 million SDR, again, as in 
the International regime, depending on the gross tonnage47. Norms on compulsory 
insurance, strict liability and loss of limitation are also taken from the International 
regime. In the second instance, the HNS Fund compensates up to a maximum 
of 250 million SDR, in cases when: the amount exceeds the shipowner’s liability; 
the shipowner is exonerated or financially incapable of meeting the obligations. 
Reflecting on the fact that HNS come in many types and forms, the HNS fund 
consists of four separate Accounts: oil, liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum 
gas, and a general account, divided into bulk solids and other HNS. Receivers 
 
45 Types of damage covered: loss of life or personal injury on board or outside the ship carrying the 
HNS, loss of or damage to property outside the ship, economic losses resulting from contamina-
tion of the environment, e.g. in the fishing, mariculture and tourism sectors, costs of preventive 
measures, e.g. clean-up operations at sea and onshore, costs of reasonable measures of reinstate-
ment of the environment. It shall not apply to a pollution damage caused by persistent oil, as to 
avoid any clash with the 1992 CLC. Additionally, the HNS Convention shall also not be applied in 
cases of non-pollution damage, damage caused by radioactive materials, and claims arising from 
contracts of carriage.
46 For more information, visit: http://www.hnsconvention.org/en/.
47 Under 2.000 gross tonnage – 10 million SDR; 2.001 to 50.000 gross tonnage – additional 1.500 
SDR per unit of tonnage; over 50.000 gross tonnage – additional 631 SDR per unit of tonnage.
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of the HNS, individuals or companies, are to contribute to the HNS fund, depending 
on the quantities of cargo received, above certain thresholds48.
As stated above, the Convention is presently not in force, and as for now, the 
1996 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims is the governing 
regulation for this area. The reasons for drafting are pretty straightforward: potential 
massive claims for environmental damage by non-oil pollutants, damage other then 
pollution, packaged dangerous cargo washed up on beaches and other. Although 
the international community expressed a will to resolve these and other issues 
by constructing an according international regime, problems occurred, especially 
when regarding the proposed HNS fund. Unlike the International regime funds, the 
contributors in the HNS fund would consist of small or medium sized companies 
that have no previous responsibility for the carriage of their cargo and no influence 
over the quality of the ships carrying the cargo. Also, when Exxon Mobil, in the 
example of the Exxon Valdez case, paid vast amounts of compensation money, it 
did so to preserve a good image of the company, although some authors doubt 
whether this could be attributed to the companies in question49. Additionally, as 
very little is known on the possible damages resulting from an average or a major 
spill of HNS, it is difficult to make a proper risk calculation, which puts into a 
question the willingness of the P&I clubs to providing proper insurance rates. And 
as we have seen previously, without their cooperation, it is unlikely that the HNS 
Convention will come into force. With the trade of chemicals and other HNS in 
constant rise50, it is however imperative that the Convention sees the light of the 
day, despite the mentioned difficulties.
OTHER PROPOSED OR ABANDONED FUNDS
Apart from the oil and HNS regimes, there exists a variety of other fund 
proposals that might come to the existence, never came to the existence, or were 
never seriously contemplated. In order to address the final question posed at the 
beginning of the Paper, the apparent lack of liability funds in the maritime field, 
and to try to provide an answer on why is this so, a quick survey of the additional 
48 Persistent oil: 150.000 tons, non-persistent oil: 20.000 tons, liquefied petroleum gas: 20.000 tons, 
liquefied natural gas: no minimum quantity, bunker oil and other H&N substances: 20.000 tons.
49 More on these arguments, see: Güner, M.D., “Transport of Hazardous and Noxious Goods by 
Sea – The IMDG Code”, in: Basedow, J., Magnus, U. (ed.), “Pollution of the sea – Prevention and 
Compensation”, Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, vol. 10 (Springer, Berlin, 2007), pp. 105.
50 For data, see: Lewis, A., “Availability of data on HNS Transport by Sea”, IOPC Funds Study, avail-
able at: www.hnsconvention.org/en/; for opinions of the industry, see: “The Ratification of the HNS 
Convention – the Perspective of the Chemical Industry”, CEFIC, available at: www.hnsconvention.
org/en/.
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fund plans will be delivered. One of the abandoned projects is the European Fund 
for Compensation of Oil Damage in European Waters and Related Measures (in 
further text: COPE)51. As a result of major spills of oil in European waters, the 
EU Commission, unsatisfied with the International regime, proposed a setting 
up of a regional fund, with up to €1 billion available for compensation. Severe 
penalties would have been imposed on polluters, not just oil polluters, but also 
bunker oil, chemicals and other. Financial penalties would have been set for gross 
negligent behavior. These measures reflected the findings of the Commission: 
although the promptness of the compensation is satisfactory, a number of issues 
arise: amounts of limitation are too low, channeling of liability is too exclusive, 
loss of liability (solely calculated on the basis of the size of the ship) is too hard to 
achieve, incentive for employing a good standard of shipping is too low, and the 
definition of environmental damage is too narrow52. As we can see, such findings 
and suggestions depart from the principles of the International regime, and 
encompass certain provisions of the US regime, most significantly, the unlimited 
liability and gross negligence factors. Obviously, there was an incentive in Europe 
to break some of the concepts of the International regime, and thus create an 
opening for a harmonization of the two separate systems. The International regime 
responded promptly, to evade a creation of yet another separate fund, and created 
the Supplementary Fund. Although regarding the loss of liability nothing changed, 
the EU Commission dropped the proposal, obviously settled with the increase of 
the coverage. This occurrence, however, indicates that there is an understanding 
among at least some Members53 of the International regime that some provisions 
of the system are a subject of a possible change in the future.
Another interesting proposal introduces the International Convention for 
Liability and Compensation relating to Non Toxic Pollution from Shipping54. The 
Convention tries to deal with the claims arising out of pollution not related to 
the toxic elements, recognizing the fact this area is considered to be a loop in the 
overall cover of pollution from shipping, that so far it is the Governments who are 
51 For more information on the subject, see: “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the establishment of a fund for the compensation of oil pollution damage in 
European waters and related measures”, COM (2000) 802 final - Official Journal C 120 E, 24 April 
2001.
52 More on this and other issues related to the COPE, see: Faure, M., Wang, H., “Liability for Oil Pol-
lution: Recent Damages”, Environmental Liability, vol. 12, issue 2, 2004, pp. 55-67.
53 As an example of a country outside of Europe that also asked for an unlimited liability, Pavliha 
reminds that: “Some states, including Japan, advocated unlimited liability, but this proposal was ulti-
mately rejected” Pavliha, M., Grbec, M., footnote 7, pp. 320.
54 More information on the subject can be found in: “A Background Document for the Development 
of a International Convention for Liability and Compensation relating to Non Toxic Pollution from 
Shipping (NTS Convention)”, KIMO, available at: www.kimointernational.org.
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responsible for cleanup and damage costs of such incidents, and finally, that victims 
of this sort of pollution are unable to receive a full and prompt compensation. What 
is of interest for our topic is the fact that the potential risk and compensation levels 
are too small to require a creation of a special fund55. This goes to demonstrate that 
in many occasions a normal market or P&I insurance is sufficient in providing the 
necessary coverage for potential claims, and that there is no need to accumulate 
additional funds and put them aside.
Following example is an international document that does provide a fund, but 
with a questionable utility. The Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental Protection 
to the Antarctic Treaty (in further text: Madrid Protocol), concerned with the issues 
of liability arising from environmental emergencies, establishes an International 
fund that would serve for “reimbursement of the reasonable and justified costs 
incurred by a Party or Parties in taking response action”56. A further provision states 
that any State or person may voluntarily contribute to the International fund. It 
is highly questionable whether such a fund, where a contribution is defined on 
a strictly voluntary basis, could serve any realistic purpose. One of the possible 
explanations may be that there is no necessity for obligatory contributions, as the 
current needs of the Antarctic area do not require a constant assets-full fund. In 
a low probability case of an accident, an international solidarity, it is assumed, 
would come into place, such like in the example of the Lebanon spill57 (during the 
recent outbreak of the hostilities). A lesson that can be taken from this example 
is that a fund with obligatory compensation should be formed in cases when it is 
really necessary to have one: otherwise, the assets that have to be kept intact and 
unutilized, are wasted.
Another example, the Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage 
Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 
(in further text: Basel Protocol), following the Basel Convention on the Control 
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wasted and their Disposal58, will be 
shortly reviewed. Although advocated by many, including UNEP and many of the 
developing countries, the existence of a fund is still debated. The developed countries 
question the need for such fund, obviously not willing to contribute. The problem 
is obviously still observed as a local one (whereas for instance in the oil pollution 
case, the effects of a major spill are likely an international phenomena). However, 
the waste and waste disposal problems can only become a bigger problem, and the 
55 KIMO, ibid, pp. 8.
56 “Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty - Liability Arising 
From Environmental Emergencies”, Art. 12 – The Fund, available at; www.ats.aq/.
57 For more information on this issue, see: Kerambrun, L., Poncet, F., “Lebanon Oil Spill”, Spillcon 
2007, available at www.cedre.fr.
58 For more information on the Convention and the Protocol, visit: www.basel.int.
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sooner the international community recognizes this as a serious question, the better 
will the nature be protected. This example goes to show how sometimes political 
issues (not enough international understanding, a fear of losing political points for 
devoting a part of a budget for hardly tangible purposes) can serve as a significant 
deterrent in accomplishing a successful establishment of an international liability 
fund where it is potentially needed.
On the other hand, very recently, another voluntary fund has been established 
that, even though wavering at the start, might prove to be very successful in the 
future, thus opening a whole new specter of international maritime funds activities 
(as noted in the introductory part). In April of 2008, the Malacca-Singapore Aids 
to Navigation Fund was established, with a goal of maintaining the navigational 
safety in the named Straits (maintaining buoys and other navigational aids). The 
first interesting thing to note is that the founding members include, together with 
the littoral countries of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, an international non-
governmental organization called Nippon Foundation59, which deals with shipping 
for decades. It is currently also the major contributor to the funds’ assets (initial 
contribution of $1.35 million, $2.5 million for the next year). This goes to signify 
how much influence an NGO can play in the international community. Second, 
and the most interesting attribute is the fact that the users are now expected to 
contribute to the Fund. According to the Lloyd’s List60, Greece and the Middle 
East Navigation Aids Service (MENAS)61 each plan to contribute $1 million, 
followed up by the Japanese Shipowners’ Association with $700.000. Much is also 
expected from the so-called “Round Table” of shipping organizations (International 
Chamber of Shipping and the International Shipping Federation, Bimco, Intercargo 
and Intertanko)62, thus opening the gate for the industry contribution. The main 
argument that calls for the users’ contribution has been summarized by stating 
that “with many of the 90,000 vessels that pass through the straits merely in transit 
and of no benefit to the coastal nations there has been a push for users and user states 
to contribute”63. Some even went on to suggest that the final beneficiaries of the 
trade conducted through the Straits should also be made to participate64. There is 
59 For more information on the Nippon Foundation, visit: www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/eng/in-
dex.html.
60 “Malacca Strait navigation fund falls $2.1m short”, at: www.lloydslist.com/ll/home/index.htm.
61 More on MENAS and their services, visit: http://www.menas.org/index.htm.
62 For more information on the Round Table, visit: www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/home/roundtab
le?SID=21e48fef07f4ca9cc31c00411b9c068b.
63 “Malacca Strait navigation fund falls $2.1m short”, footnote 60; For estimates on the num-
ber of vessels expected in the future, visit: www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/eng/news/2008/
20080508MalaccaFundStarts1.html.
64 “Malacca Strait navigation fund falls $2.1m short”, footnote 60.
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evidence to contemplate some larger undergoing in the law of the sea and maritime 
law, as some talk of “efforts that break free from the traditional concept that the seas 
may be used free of charge”65 as the Fund administration plans to “seek contributions 
to this fund as part of the corporate social responsibility of companies, such as shipping 
firms”66. However, such a contribution is still contemplated as a voluntary one, 
whereas the founding member-States have the obligation of compensating any 
shortages to the Funds’ budget (in which case the voluntary contribution from the 
States becomes a compulsory one, a method that could prove to be very effective, 
not only in obtaining the contributions, but also in steering up the lobbying of the 
States (that have financial obligations) to incorporate into the financial scheme as 
many other entities as possible). Although going out of the scope of the definition 
of the international liability maritime funds, there is a number of characteristics 
that make this Fund extremely interesting to observe. What will be the reaction of 
the shipping industry? If they agree to step in here, how will they be able to divert 
their responsibility in areas described earlier? What is the role of the coastal state 
that seems to be more and more interested in putting pressure on those sectors that 
have so far only served as beneficiaries? Is the move to securing the navigational 
equipment by involving the financial contribution of all the interested parties only 
a prelude to a more complex fund systems, that would consider paying for the 
protection against piracy (an issue that has troubled some parts of the World for 
quite a number of years, only to be revived very recently with the violent occurrences 
in Somalia, this time possibly effecting World as a whole, as it disturbs the regular 
flow of oil), ensuring that the salvage service is ever-present on a stationery basis 
(something that only a handful of States have secured so far, in their own territorial 
waters), and thus pave the way for the more complex liability schemes, some of 
which have been mentioned previously? As the growing demand of States tightens, 
it will be interesting to observe the reaction of the industry, especially with the 
decline of freight rates and the necessity of cutting off the number of vessels on 
order, in mind.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the number of the existing liability funds in the maritime 
field can be recounted with the fingers of one hand, whereas the actual need of 
the same is somewhat larger. Whether it is the political (political points, lack of 
international understanding, difference in general policy), economical (a question 
65 “Towards an “Aids to Navigation Fund” in the Malacca and Singapore Straits”, The Nippon Founda-
tion Blogzine, at: http://blog.canpan.info/tnf/archive/53.
66 Ibid.
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of the budget and additional taxes, funds that are simply stocked and not utilized) 
or legal (different definitions and understandings of the same term, different core 
principles, different approach towards the relationship between the national and 
international law) reasoning, there seems to be in existence a number of deterrents 
towards a more broader and accepted usage of international liability funds. A 
major explanatory point for this state of affairs can be found in a simple fact that 
the countries are usually not too anxious to give away their money, especially if 
this money isn’t put in immediate use, but rather placed on hold in a case it is 
needed. Other contributors are more likely to participate (such as the oil industry 
for example), providing that it is they who are dictating the terms, with a clear 
goal of improving their public image and trying to get as much as possible of 
the given assets back. The insurance and reinsurance market seems to be able to 
cover large insurance policies, and thus offer enough security to promote different 
types of enterprises. The core reason of employing a liability fund scheme can 
be found in the cases where huge amounts of money are deemed to be asked 
if something should go wrong, and where insurance companies are simply not 
willing to invest due to a high risk factor. Today this is the ocean trade and nature 
protection. Tomorrow it could be high orbit/space transportation and alternative 
energy projects. All of them have one thing in common: State support and funding. 
And regarding questions of international value, the analog international support 
and funding. It is highly commendable that the international community has come 
up with the International regime scheme. Although differences remain, and the 
division is clear, it is a good sign that in the future more understanding will be 
shown in trying to resolve the mentioned issues, or those which are only yet to 
present themselves.
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Sažetak:
MEĐUNARODNI POMORSKI FONDOVI ZA ODGOVORNOST
Cilj rada je istražiti trenutačno stanje, kompleksnost i međusobno djelovanje 
nacionalnih, regionalnih i međunarodnim pomorskih fondova za odgovornost. 
Raspravlja se o njihovoj ekonomskoj pozadini i novčanoj vrijednosti, političkom 
značaju i važnosti, te pravnoj formi i problemima koji ih prate. Nužna usporedba radi 
se između CLC i HNS sustava s jedne, te OPA 90’ i CERCLA sustava SAD-a s druge 
strane, kako bi se utvrdile ključne točke razmimoilaženja, njihova vrijednost i utjecaj 
na praksu, istovremeno razmišljajući o mogućnosti približavanja udaljenih filozofija 
djelovanja. Ujedno, kratko se razmatraju pitanja ograničenja odgovornosti, utjecaja 
P&I klubova, usmjeravanja odgovornosti (“channeling of liability”) te moralnog rizika 
zloupotrebe brodarstva. Poseban osvrt koncentrira se na predloženi Europski fond, 
Konvenciju o neškodljivom onečišćenju, Madridskom protokolu, Bazelskom protokolu 
te Fondu za navigacijsku opremu u Malacca-Singapur prolazu. Svaki od navedenih 
dokumenata ili ima utemeljen fond koji djeluje više ili manje djelotvorno, s više ili manje 
šanse za uspjeh, ili uopće ne treba fond, shvaćanje čega pomaže prilikom određivanja 
uvjeta koje osnivanje fonda mora zadovoljiti. Konačno, daje se nekoliko zaključnih 
razmišljanja u svezi opće korisnosti navedenih fondova, s nekoliko predviđanja za 
budući razvoj događaja.
Ključne riječi: CLC, OPA 90’, pomorski fondovi za odgovornost, ograničenje 
odgovornosti, P&I. 
